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INTRODUCTION

In the context of the "hanging paragraph" of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a), recent bankruptcy decisions have reached varying conclusions regarding whether a "purchase-money security interest" (PMSI)
t
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secures the portion of a retail automotive loan attributable to paying
off the borrower's negative equity in a trade-in vehicle. On this issue,
several circuit courts' and the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel 2 have ruled, the Second Circuit is currently hearing a case, 3 and
the lower courts have decided numerous cases. 4 This Note will provide a comprehensive survey of the positions of various courts and a
critique and analysis of those positions and will argue for a legislative
solution to the problem.
This question arose because of changes in the bankruptcy law enacted by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Prior to 2005, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case, if a secured claim exceeded the value of collateral, the Bankruptcy Code treated any shortfalls as unsecured. 5 This treatment
meant that debtors could "cram-down" the secured portion of claims
to the value of the collateral with the remainder being treated as unsecured. 6 While debtors had to pay the secured portion in full, they
7
received a discharge for the unpaid portion at the end of the plan.
This occurred most frequently with automobile loans because the vehicles were often worth less than the remaining obligation. 8 The difference in values increased when lenders rolled negative equity from
trade-in vehicles into the new loans.
The BAPCPA changed those rules by adding the so-called "hanging paragraph" to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 9 This section is called the
"hanging paragraph" because, although it appears at the end of
§ 1325(a), it is not numbered and is not directly connected to the
previous numbered paragraph, which is 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9).10
The hanging paragraph essentially gives covered lenders secured
See, e.g.,
In re Callicott, No. 09-1030, 2009 WL 2870501 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009); In re
Mierkowski, No. 08-3866, 2009 WIL 2853586 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); In re Dale, No. 0820583, 2009 WL 2857998 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re
Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295 (1]th Cir. 2008).
2 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2008).
3 See Reiber v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177 (2d
Cir. 2008), certifying question to In re Peaslee, 2009 N.Y. slip op. 05197, 2009 WL 1766000
(N.Y. June 24, 2009). The Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York
Court of Appeals: "Is the portion of an automobile retail instalment [sic] sale attributable
to a trade-in vehicle's 'negative equity' a part of the 'purchase-money obligation' arising
from the purchase of a new car, as defined under NewYork's U.C.C.?" Id. at 186. The New
York Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 split decision, answered this question in the affirmative. See
In re Peaslee, 2009 N.Y. slip op. 05197, 2009 WIL 1766000, (N.Y. June 24, 2009).
4 See infra Parts II and III.
5 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
6 See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 839-42 (discussing the relevance of purchase-money status).
7
8

9
10

Id. at 840.
Id.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
Penrod, 392 B.R. at 840-41.

NEGATIVE EQUITY

2009]

claims for the entire amounts of the loans." This paragraph is important because a Chapter 13 debtor must provide for payment in full of
all secured claims instead of providing for payment of only the value
of the collateral. 12 Therefore, whether a claim qualified for treatment
under the hanging paragraph became a key question.
For a creditor to qualify for the protections of the hanging paragraph on motor vehicle 13 loans, a debtor must have incurred the obligation within 910 days of filing the petition and the vehicle must have
been for the debtor's personal use.' 4 For collateral consisting of
"other thing[s] of value," the debtor must have incurred the obligation within the preceding year. 15 Finally, regardless of the type of collateral, the creditor's security interest must be a PMSI. 16 The vast
majority of courts have held that the BAPCPA refers to state law found
in U.C.C. § 9-103.17 "Purchase-money security interest" in a consumer
good is a term that originated in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), although the treatment of such interests is much like preCode law.' 8
When applying the U.C.C. definition, identification of a PMSI is
usually easy. A typical example is a seller of goods retaining an interest in those goods to secure the payment of all or some of the price of
those goods.' 9 Third-party lenders can also retain a PMSI in a consumer good. This occurs when they make advances or incur obligations "to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the
collateral" where those advances or obligations are "in fact so used" to
20
acquire rights in that collateral.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest in
goods has purchase-money status "to the extent that the goods are
2
purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest." 1
11
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (excluding loans meeting the hanging paragraph's requirements from the operation of 11 U.S.C. § 506, the provision that previously allowed the
cram-down" of all secured loans in Chapter 13).
12
Id. § 1325(a) (5).
13 "Motor vehicle" is defined by 49 U.S.C. § 30102. Id. § 1325(a); see 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102 (a) (6) (2006) (defining "motor vehicle" as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, [not
including] a vehicle operated only on a rail line").
14 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
15
16

Id.
Id.

17 See, e.g.,
In re Austin, 381 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008) (holding that a PMSI
secured negative equity); In reJohnson, 380 B.R. 236 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007).
18

See, e.g., 4JAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 31-

6(a) (5th ed. 2002) (discussing treatment of such interests both under the U.C.C. and preCode).
19

Id.

20

U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2) (2006).

21

Id. § 9-103(b) (1).
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"Purchase-money collateral" means "goods . . . that secure[ ] a
'22
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.
A "purchase-money obligation" is "an obligation ... incurred as all or
part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in
fact so used." 23 Banks making loans give value that allows the debtor
to acquire rights in the vehicle to qualify for purchase-money status.
Loans that contain negative equity, which generally fall in the
third-party-lender category, are more difficult. There are questions of
whether the negative equity is "part of the price" or if it "enable[d]
the debtor to acquire rights." 24 In addition to these questions, courts
have also disagreed on whether negative equity transforms an entire
security interest into a non-purchase-money interest (applying the socalled "transformation" rule 25) or whether both purchase-money and
non-purchase-money security interests secure such loans (the so-called
"dual-status" rule).26
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio introduced an interesting federalism question when it held that, for purposes of the hanging paragraph, PMSI had a federal common-law
definition and a PMSI did not secure negative equity. 27 Judge Russ
Kendig reasoned that, although the term originated in the Uniform
Commercial Code, Congress did not specify that state law must apply
for the definition and that this omission left interpretation of the term
open to the federal judiciary. 28 He further reasoned that federal policy conflicted with the use of state law. 29 The federal bankruptcy policy of providing uniform treatment was failing, and there was no state
interest in having the U.C.C. definition apply based on the U.C.C.'s
comments disavowing its application to bankruptcy law.3 0 Although a
number of courts have cited the Ohio decision, to date, no court has
followed by applying a federal definition, thereby continuing the split
3
in authority. '
22

23
24

Id. § 9-103(a) (1).

Id. § 9-103(a) (2).
Id. § 9-103 (a) (2).
25 E.g., In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007), rev'd, 562 F.3d
618 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Cassidy, 362 B.R. 596 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007).
26
E.g., Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2008); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); Citifinancial
Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36 (D. Kan. 2007).
27 In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
28 See id. at 216-20.
29 See id. at 217.
30 See id. at 219.
31
See, e.g., In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 830-31 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), affd sub nom. Ford
v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Look, 383
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This split in authority, which the Westfall court characterized as a
"maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions," 3 2 leaves Chapter 13
debtors and creditors with little guidance. Debtors have only uncertain expectations of whether courts will permit negative equity to be
crammed down and they face the increased expense of additional litigation on the question. Creditors, already faced with other difficulties
in valuing subprime automotive loans, encounter added uncertainty
regarding how courts will treat particular loans. The current economic climate and the importance of revenues from auto financing to
struggling automotive manufacturers 33 give this issue additional
importance.
Part I of this Note will discuss the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the change in the cramdown rules, and the effects of those changes. Part II will provide a
comprehensive review of the current case law and describe the various
approaches taken by the courts. Part III will discuss the outlier approach of the Northern District of Ohio. Part IV will analyze the decisions described in Parts II and III, argue that the Ohio Court erred by
applying a federal definition, and finally argue that a federal legislative solution is both appropriate and desirable.
I
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT, CHANGE IN CRAM-DowN RULES

The Bankruptcy Code generally does not permit secured claims
to exceed the value of the collateral securing the loan.3 4 Section
506(a) (1) provides that a claim is secured by the creditor's interest in
the bankruptcy estate's interest in the collateral. 3 5 The valuation standard for the estate's interest is the "replacement-value" standard,
B.R. 210, 218 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008), affd sub nom. Bank of Am. v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 139
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In reJohnson 380 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007). But see
Penrod, 392 B.R. at 844-46, 856-60 (purporting to apply state law to answer whether a
purchase-money security interest existed and then applying federal law to determine
whether the transformation or dual-status rule should apply).
32
Westfall, 376 B.R. at 213.
33 See Sharon Silke Carty, GMAC, Key to GM's Survival, Gets $5 Billion in Federal Aid;
Goal: Start Lending to 'Broader Group', USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 2008, at 3B (characterizing
GMAC as "GM's crown jewel"; noting that GMAC regularly outearned automotive operations for years; and providing the example that in 2006, a year in which GM's auto operations lost $3.2 billion, "GMAC pulled in $2.2 billion").
34 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1) (2006) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest ...is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property... and is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of
such allowed claim.").
35
Id.
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which sets the value at what the debtor would have to pay for comparable property.3 6 Because the estate's interest in the collateral is limited to the replacement value of the collateral, the creditor's interest
limited to the estate's interest thus cannot exceed the value of that
collateral. To the extent that a claim is greater than the creditor's
interest, the Bankruptcy Code treats the claim as unsecured. 37 The
result is the bifurcation of the creditor's claim into secured and unsecured portions.
Prior to passing of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, this bifurcation of the creditor's claim enabled
Chapter 13 debtors to "cram-down" claims. A Chapter 13 plan's treatment of a secured claim could be confirmed if either the secured
creditor accepted the plan, the debtor surrendered the collateral to
the creditor, or the debtor chose to retain the collateral and exercised
the 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5)(B) "cram-down" power. 38 This power
would reduce the secured portion of the loan to the value of the collateral, with the remainder becoming unsecured. 39 This was of special
importance, because while the Chapter 13 plans were required to provide for payment of secured claims in full over the life of the plan, the
40
court would discharge the remaining unsecured balance.
These provisions were particularly important in the context of automotive loans. Automotive loans are often "upside down," meaning
that the value of the car securing the loan is less than the amount
owed. The very nature of automobiles contributes to this problem
41
because they tend to depreciate and lose market value quickly.
Lending practices-such as six- and seven-year loan periods, zerodown loans, and high financing charges-have also contributed to the
problem. 42 As many as one in four consumers trading vehicles in has
owed more on the trade-in vehicle than it is worth, and this figure

36 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 n.6 (1997).
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
38 See id. § 1325(a) (5); Assocs. Commercial Corp., 520 U.S. at 957 (discussing application
of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5) where a debtor chose to keep the collateral for use and exercise
the "cram-down" power).
39 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 839-42
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the relevance of purchase-money status).
40 Id. at 840; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (providing requirements for discharge).
41
See Robert Henderson, UnderstandingFinance: Auto Financing,MIAMI TIMES, Apr.
2-8, 2008, at 6D (advising consumers to avoid loans greater than four years due the depreciating value).
42
See Danny Hakim, Owing More on an Auto than It's Worth as a Trade-In, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2004, at C1 (discussing, one year before the passing of BAPCPA, the escalation
from 2001-04 of lending practices resulting in such loans); Henderson, supra note 41 (discussing financing practices that consumers should be wary of).
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only accounts for those who are purchasing vehicles. 43 Trade-in negative equity contributes to this problem by allowing buyers to start "upside down."
Against this backdrop, the so-called "hanging paragraph" stepped
in. The BAPCPA was the culmination of reform efforts over a number
44
of years and the greatest change to the Bankruptcy Code since 1978.
The Act, in what some have called an "uninformed rush by Congress
to prevent bankruptcy abuse,' 4 5 amended 11 U.S.C. § 1325.46 The
amendment to section 1325 added the "hanging paragraph" after 11

U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9):
For purposes of [11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)] paragraph (5), section 506
shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor
has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the
subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for
that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the personal

use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other
thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period
47
preceding that filing.

If the hanging paragraph applies, it prevents "cram-down" in
Chapter 13 cases. It operates by preventing section 506 from applying
and bifurcating the creditor's claim for purposes of section
1325 (a) (5), which gives the conditions for plan approval relating to
secured claims. 48 Thus, for purposes of plan approval, the hanging
paragraph treats the creditor as if it has a secured claim for the entire
amount owed, regardless of the collateral's value. 49 Treating the creditor in this way requires the debtor to pay the full amount of such a
43
See Rosland B. Gammon, Dealers Hunt Upside-Down Buyers with Leases, Incentives and
Long-Term Loans, AUTOMOTIVE NEwS, May 5, 2008, at 38 (reporting figures from Edmunds.
corn for March of 2008).
44
See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (reviewing the legislative
history of the BAPCPA); George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments Under
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 37
(2007) (discussing the BAPCPA generally in the introduction).
45
Timothy D. Moratzka, The "HangingParagraph"and Cramdown: 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)
and 506 After BAPCPA, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2006, at 18.
46
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80 (2005); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
47
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). For context, note the titles within the original act. The hanging paragraph appears in Title III, section 306(b) of the Act. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 306(b). Title III is entitled "Discouraging Bankruptcy
Abuse," section 306 is entitled "Giving Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13,"
and subsection (b), which carries the amendment, is entitled "Restoring the Foundation
for Secured Credit." Id.
48
See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 839-41
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (discussing pre-BAPCPA law regarding cram-down and changes
made by the hanging paragraph).
49

Id. at 840.
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loan because the court cannot approve a Chapter 13 plan that does
not provide for the payment in full of the secured claim. 50
The hanging paragraph outlines five conditions for a creditor, in
the context of a motor vehicle loan, to qualify for its protection:
(1) the creditor must have a "purchase-money security interest"
(PMSI), (2) that PMSI must secure the debt that is subject to the
claim, (3) the debt must have been incurred within the 910 days preceding the filing of the petition, (4) the collateral must be a motor
vehicle as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 30102, and (5) the motor vehicle
must have been acquired for the personal use of the debtor.5 1 For
debt not secured by automobiles, requirements three, four, and five
are replaced by the requirements that (3) the collateral consist of any
other thing of value, and (4) the debt must have been incurred dur52
ing the year preceding the filing of the petition.
The requirement that a PMSI secure the debt is the subject of this
Note. Although some dispute on the other requirements is possible,
most of the requirements are easy to understand and the most problematic is the PMSI issue. This requirement is particularly important
regarding negative equity financed into the loan because such negative equity will always be above the value of the car purchased, and
therefore, depending on purchase-money status, it will be either
wholly unsecured or wholly secured. Two major questions will determine the answer: (1) what law applies to define PMSI, and (2) under
that law, what constitutes a PMSI.
II
CASES APPLYING (OR PURPORTING TO APPLY) STATE LAW

The vast majority of cases have held that state law defines the
term "purchase-money security interest" (PMSI) as used by the hanging paragraph. 53 Courts applying state law to determine purchasemoney status look to the various state enactments of section 9-103 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 54 Those courts apply one of three
50
See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. Of course, this assumes that the
holder of the secured claim does not accept the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5) (A) (giving the alternative condition that "the holder of such claim has accepted the plan").
51
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a); see also Penrod,392 B.R. at 841 (discussing the requirements of
the "Hanging Paragraph").
52
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
53
See, e.g., Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301
(I1th Cir. 2008); Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 923-26
(E.D. Mich. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Home, 390 BR, 191, 197 (E.D. Va.
2008); In reWall, 376 B.R. 769, 770-71 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2007); Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 258 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 45 (D. Kan. 2007).
54 See Graupner,537 F.3d at 1301; Muldrew, 396 B.R. at 923-26; Home, 390 B.R. at 197;
Wal 376 B.R. at 770-71; Peaslee, 373 B.R. at 258; CitifinancialAuto, 369 B.R. at 45.
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rules regarding the purchase-money status of negative equity financed
into the otherwise purchase-money loan. These rules are: (1) a PMSI
secures the negative equity;5 5 (2) the so-called transformation rule,

under which a PMSI does not secure the negative equity and the presence of a non-purchase-money obligation transforms the entire obligation into a non-purchase-money debt; 56 and (3) the so-called dualstatus rule, which bifurcates the loan into purchase-money and nonpurchase-money obligations. 57 This Part will examine the Uniform
Commercial Code definition and these three approaches. Part III will
address which rule is the better approach.
In the consumer goods context, the Uniform Commercial Code
defines PMSI in section 9-103(b) (1).58 A security interest is a PMSI
"to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest. ' 59 Section 9-103(a) (1) defines
"purchase-money collateral" as "goods . . .that secure [ ] a purchase-

money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral." 60 A
"purchase-money obligation" is defined in section 9-103(a) (2) as "an
obligation . . .incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or

for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
the collateral if the value is in fact so used." 61
This definition provides two categories of PMSI: sellers who retain an interest to secure payment of part of the price achieve
purchase-money status through the first category for obligations incurred "as all or part of the price"; and third parties-such as banksachieve purchase-money status through the second category for "value
given to enable. '62 Most negative-equity cases involve third-party finance companies and therefore fall into the "value given" category. 6 3
55

See, e.g., Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1303; Muldrew, 396 B.R. at 924; Wall, 376 B.R. at

770-71.
56
See, e.g., In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220-21 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008), affd sub nom. Bank
of Am. v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In re
Schwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 864
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R.
724, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
57
See, e.g.,
In re Mierkowski, No. 08-44196-399, 2008 AIL 4449471, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. Sept. 29, 2008), rev'd, No. 08-3866, 2009 WL 2853586 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); In re
Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 401
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Bandura, No. 08-50378, 2008 WL 2782851, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky. July 15, 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796,
808 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); CitifinancialAuto, 369 B.R. at 46-47.
58
U.C.C. § 9-103(b) (1) (2006).

59
60

Id.
Id. § 9-103(a)(1).
61
Id. § 9-103(a) (2).
62
See generally 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18 (discussing purchase-money status).
63
See, e.g., In rePrice, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp.
(In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne,
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The difficulty of determining whether negative equity can qualify
for purchase-money status centers on whether it is part of the "price"
64
or "value given" to enable a debtor to acquire rights in the collateral.
Regarding "price" or "value given to enable," official Comment 3 of
U.C.C. § 9-103 states that the terms include "obligations for expenses
incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales
taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage
in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection
and enforcement, attorney's fees, and other similar obligations." 65 As
mentioned previously, a court can apply one of three rules: negative
66
equity as a PMSI, the transformation rule, or the dual-status rule.

A number of courts, including the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits,
have held that a PMSI does secure negative equity in this type of loan
and that therefore negative equity does not eliminate the purchasemoney status of the obligation. 6 7 Though purportedly applying state
law, courts in this category often cite Congress's intent to provide protection for creditors. 68 Regarding "price," some of these courts read
U.C.C. § 9-103 in pari materia69 with the definition of "cash sales price"
or "cash price" in motor vehicle statutes and conclude that a distinction exists between "cash price" and "price."70 In addition, many
courts point to the "other similar obligations" language of U.C.C. § 9103 Comment 3. 71 Courts also cite the "close nexus" between the financing of negative equity and the acquisition in determining that the
two were "part of a single transaction," giving that transaction
purchase-money status. 7 2 Finally, in choosing not to apply the dualstatus rule, which would still provide some protection to creditors,
courts point to the wording of the BAPCPA, which says that the cramdown provision will not apply if the creditor has a PMSI securing the
debt; some courts read this language to mean a PMSI securing any part
390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252
(W.D.N.Y. 2007).
64
See, e.g., Home, 390 B.R. at 198-99; In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 912-13 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 2006), affJd sub nom. Graupner,537 F.3d 1295.
65
U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
66
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
67
See Price, 562 F.3d 618; Graupner,537 F.3d at 1301-03.
68
See, e.g.,
Peaslee, 373 B.R. at 261; see also In re Long, 519 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008)
(discussing Congress's intention to use the hanging paragraph to provide protection for
creditors in cases involving surrenders of collateral).
69 In pan materia (Latin for "in the same matter") refers to a canon of construction
that statutes in pari materia be construed together to resolve inconsistencies in one statute
by looking at another statute on the same subject. See BLACK'S LAW Dic-riONARV 862 (9th
ed. 2009).
70
See, e.g., Peaslee,373 B.R. at 261; In reSchwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 633 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2008); In re Cohrs, 373 B.R. 107, 109-10 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007); In re Petrocci, 370 B.R.
489, 494-96 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007).
71
E.g., Graupner,537 F.3d at 1301.
72
Cohrs, 373 B.R. at 110.
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of the debt, rather than meaning a PMSI securing the full amount of
the debt (which could only be satisfied if a PMSI secured negative
equity) .73

The New York Court of Appeals, the only state high court to address this issue, used similar reasoning in answering a certified question from the Second Circuit. The court first addressed "price" and
"value given" and gave both of these terms a "broad interpretation. '74
The court also looked to the use of the term "price" in the New York
Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, under which negative equity is included in the "cash sale price." 75 Finally, the court looked to
Comment 3 of U.C.C. § 9-103 and reasoned that because a buyer
would often not be able to purchase a new vehicle without the financ76
ing of negative equity, a "close nexus" existed.
By delivering a split opinion, the court failed to provide an answer that is likely to bring unity to future cases. An authoritative statement from the New York Court of Appeals, a highly influential court
on U.C.C. matters, might have had this effect. However, in a powerful
dissent, Judge George Bundy Smith showed flaws in the majority's reasoning. 77 Judge Smith criticized the majority for failing to consider
the purpose of a PMSI and seeming to interpret the hanging paragraph rather than Article 9 of the U.C.C. He pointed out that a PMSI
serves the function of giving a creditor who makes the purchase of
goods possible first claim to those goods. He rephrased the issue as:
"Is a lien resulting from the refinancing of a trade-in vehicle's 'negative equity' entitled to the special priority given PMSIs over other liens
by UCC article 9?" 78 He reasoned that the answer must be no because
"'a loan procured to satisfy a pre-existing debt' is inconsistent with the
73 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) ("[S]ection 506 shall not apply to a claim ...if the
creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the
claim ...." (emphasis added)). Note that under this reasoning, the result would be the
same under the dual-status rule. Following this reasoning, applying the state law dual-status
rule, a PMSI would secure part of the claim; therefore, section 506 would not apply.
Courts applying the dual-status rule have generally bifurcated claims. See, e.g.,
Citifinancial
Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36 (D. Kan. 2007). However, the District Court for
the Western District of Texas applied the state law dual-status rule but held that the hanging paragraph still prohibited cram-down of the non-purchase-money portion of the debt
because a PMSI secured the remainder of the debt. In re Sanders, 403 B.R. 435, 444-45
(W.D. Tex. 2009) ("[T]he hanging paragraph applies to [the creditor's] claim regardless
of whether the charge for negative equity constitutes a purchase-money obligation.").
74
In re Peaslee, 2009 N.Y. slip op. 05197, 2009 WL 1766000, slip op. at 3-5 (N.Y. June
24, 2009).
75

Id.

76

Id. slip op. at 5.

The majority opinion coincides with a trend in the federal circuit courts toward
holding that a purchase-money security interest secures negative equity. See infra note 161.
How influential Judge Smith's reasoning will be remains to be seen.
78
Peaslee, 2009 WL 1766000, slip op. at 5.
77
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basic idea of a PMSI." 79 Concerned that the court was confusing the

state law and federal law questions, Judge Smith worried that the majority's decision would cloud other Article 9 issues. Whether or not
that is true, the split decision makes it unlikely that the court's pronouncement will end the debate.
As one would expect, courts deciding that portions of loans attributable to negative equity are not purchase-money obligations reason that those portions are not part of the "price" of the collateral.80
These courts find alternative support in U.C.C. § 9-103 Comment 3.
For example, in In re Sanders, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Texas reasoned that the items listed were "expense items"
that were dissimilar from negative equity.8 1 The Middle District of
Florida's Bankruptcy Court reasoned that it was unlikely that the omission of negative equity from the comment was an oversight because
negative equity differed in both "type" and "magnitude" from the
listed expenses.8 2 Regarding the in pari materia argument, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida reasoned that the term
"price of collateral" was not ambiguous, and therefore the in pari
materia doctrine did not apply.8 3 The Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that negative equity does not enable acquisition of
the collateral.8 4 Regarding nexus between acquisition of the collateral
and the debt, these courts characterize the exchange as "two separate
financial transactions memorialized on a single retail installment contract."8 5 These courts also find problems with whether the negative
equity provides direct assistance, whether the value given was "in fact
so used" to secure rights in the collateral, and whether negative equity
86
financing was required to purchase the collateral.
For courts holding that a PMSI does not secure negative equity,
the first approach is the "transformation rule." Under the transformation rule, the presence of negative equity takes the entire claim out of
79 Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Capital Commercial Auto. Fin. v. Spartan Motors, 246
A.D.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
80
See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 849-50
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
81
See In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 854-55 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435
(W.D. Tex. 2009).
82
In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 728-30 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
83
Id. at 728-29; cf. In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 06-32914, 2007 'AIL
3469454, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007) (pointing to the differing subject matter of
the motor vehicle statutes compared to the secured-transaction article of the Uniform
Commercial Code), rev'd sub nom. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191
(E.D. Va. 2008).
84
See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 850-52.
85
In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 741 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007) (citing In re Peaslee, 358 B.R.
545 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006)), rev'd, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009).
86
See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 848-51.
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the protections of the hanging paragraph.8 7 Bankruptcy courts in a
number of districts have adopted this rule; 88 however, no district or
circuit court has followed.8 9 Courts applying this rule construe the
hanging paragraph narrowly. 90 The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas compared the hanging paragraph to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code using language such as "to the extent
of"'9 1 as evidence that Congress did not intend dual-status treatment in
92
this context.
The dual-status rule is far more forgiving to creditors; under the
dual-status rule, claims are bifurcated into purchase-money and nonpurchase-money debts, and the hanging paragraph applies only to the
purchase-money component of the claim. 9 3 Revised Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code mandates this treatment in the commercial context but leaves to the courts to determine the appropriate rule
87 See In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 140-41 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007).
88 E.g., In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220-21 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008), affd sub nom. Bank of
Am. v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In re
Schwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); Price,363 B.R. at 746; In re Freeman,
362 B.R. 608, 611 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007).
89
See, e.g.,
Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1300-03
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that negative equity did not affect purchase-money status); Penrod, 392 B.R. at 858 ("[T]he analysis [behind the transformation rule] turns on the assumption that 'debt' refers to a unitary concept that cannot be divided. But the rest of the Code
belies this assumption ....");Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 262
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting bankruptcy court decisions that held that a PMSI did not secure amounts attributable to negative equity and therefore not reaching the issue of transformation rule versus dual-status rule); In re Wall, 376 B.R. 769, 771 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
2007) (holding that negative equity did not affect purchase-money status).
90 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) ("Congress could
certainly have drafted this provision to cover a broader class of creditors had it so intended."), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
91
See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7), 507(a)(8), 1322(b)(8) (2006)); see also 11
U.S.C. § 507(a) (6) (regarding prioritization and unsecured claims "only to the extent of
$4,000 for each such individual"); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (8) (regarding prioritization and "allowed unsecured claims of governmental units"); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (8) (regarding the
contents of debtor's plan for "all or part of a claim").
92
This may raise the issue of whether the choice of the dual-status versus the transformation rule should be a federal question. Some courts, such as the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel of Ninth Circuit, have chosen to apply state law to determine that a PMSI does not
secure the negative equity and apply federal law to the choice of the dual-status versus the
transformation rule. See Penrod,392 B.R. at 843-53, 855-56; see also Sanders, 377 B.R. at 860
n.21 (noting that the court's interpretation did not come from the U.C.C. or state transformation rules but from the "plain language of the [Bankruptcy] Code," which the court
interpreted as requiring that all of a creditor's claim be secured by the creditor's purchasemoney security interest). Part IV addresses problems with this choice. See infra Part IV.
The District Court for the Western District of Texas avoided some of these problems by
concluding that the hanging paragraph covered the entire debt as long as some portion of
the debt was secured by a PMSL. See Sanders, 403 B.R. 435 at 444-45 (reversing the bankruptcy court's holding that the presence of a non-purchase-money obligation in the debt
moved the entire amount out of the protection of the hanging paragraph).
93 See, e.g.,
Penrod,392 B.R. at 859 ("The Dual Status Rule gives lenders a PMSI equal
to the new value financed ... and a regular security interest for the balance.").
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in consumer transactions. 9 4 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel pointed to this default rule for non-consumer transactions in
support of applying a dual-status rule. 95 Although not addressing negative equity in particular, in their treatise on the Uniform Commercial
Code, Professors James J. White and Robert S. Summers assert that
courts should apply the business (dual-status) rule by analogy in some
consumer cases. 9 6 White and Summers discuss loans that included
the refinancing of previous purchase-money debts owed to the same
lender, a different situation than the automotive context, where the
negative equity financed is often from another lender. However,
under the business (or not "consumer goods") rule of U.C.C. § 997
103(f), these loans would still be treated under the dual-status rule.
Applied to the automotive context, where the negative equity is from
another lender, the rule states that a PMSI "does not lose its status as
such, even if.. . the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation."98 The underlying issue
in both situations is whether a document could create both purchasemoney and non-purchase-money security interests. Courts applying
the dual-status rule often have characterized the transformation rule
as being too harsh on creditors. 99
Regarding choice of the foregoing rules, no clear winner has
emerged. As the following chart demonstrates, to date, at the circuitcourt level, the Eleventh, Eighth, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits and the
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel have ruled on the issue. 10 0
Several district courts have ruled on the issue, holding either that a
94
See U.C.C. § 9-103(f) (2006) ("In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if: (1) the
purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation .... ); id. § 9-103(h) ("The limitation [of § 9-103(f) to non-consumer transactions] is
intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods
transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in
consumer-goods transactions and may continue to apply established approaches."). But cf.
Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 45-48 (D. Kan. 2007) (applying the
Kansas version of the Uniform Commercial Code, KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-9-103 (West
2008), which did not include the limiting language in U.C.C. §§ 9-103(f) and (h)).
95 Penrod, 392 B.R. at 859 ("[T]he Dual Status Rule, as the default rule under Article
9, essentially captures both the lender's reasonable expectations and the debtor's economic situation, and is consistent with the apparent purpose of the hanging paragraph.").
96
See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 31-6(a), at 137 (discussing loans, including refinancing, and stating that "[iln these cases we believe the courts should apply the
business rule by analogy").
97 See U.C.C. § 9-103(f).
98

Id.

99 In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) ("Simply, application of
the transformation rule is too severe.").
100
See In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a purchase-money security interest secured negative equity); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537
F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (lth Cir. 2008) (same); Penrod, 392 B.R. at 860 (applying the dualstatus rule).
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PMSI secured the negative equity or that the dual-status rule applied.10 1 The bankruptcy courts of the various circuits have applied
all three rules. 10 2 The following chart of cases is organized by the
state whose law is being applied, then by level of court, and then finally by date. In the "Rule" column of the chart, decisions holding
that a PMSI secures negative equity are designated "Y," those applying
the dual-status rule are designated "D," and those applying the transformation rule are designated "T."
RULE

Case Name

Citation

Court

Cir. State

Date

D

In reTuck

2007 WL 4365456

Y

In re Harless

2008 WL 3821781

Bankr. M.D. Ala.

11 Ala.

12/10/2007

Bankr. N.D. Ala.

11

D

In re Penrod

2008 WL 3854465

D

In re Acaya

Y
Y

Ala.

8/13/2008

B.A.P. 9th Cir.

9 Cal.

7/28/2008

369 B.R. 564

Bankr. N.D. Cal.

9 Cal.

5/18/2007

In re Cohrs

373 B.R. 107

Bankr. E.D. Cal.

9 Cal.

7/31/2007

In re Watson

2007 WL 2873434

Bankr. E.D. Cal.

9 Cal.

9/27/2008

T

In re Blakeslee

377 B.R. 724

Bankr. M.D. Fla.

11 Fla.

9/19/2007

T

In re Schwalm

380 B.R. 630

Bankr. M.D. Fla.

11 Fla.

1/16/2008

Y

In re Graupner

537 F.3d 1295

11th Cir.

11 Ga.

8/6/2008

Y

Graupner v.
Nuvell Credit

2007 WL 1858291

M.D. Ga.

11

Ga.

6/26/2007

Y

In re Graupner

356 B.R. 907

Bankr. M.D. Ga.

11

Ga.

12/21/2006

D

In re Hernandez

388 B.R. 883

Bankr. C.D. Ill

7 Il.

Y

In re Howard

405 B.R. 901

Bankr. N.D. Ill.

7

Y

In re Myers

393 B.R. 616

Bankr. S.D. Ind.

7 Ind.

7/13/2008

Y

In re Ford

574 F.3d 1279

10th Cir.

10 Kan.

08/03/2009

V

In re Padgett

408 B.R. 374

10th Cir. B.A.P.

10 Kan.

07/20/2009

D

Citifinancial Auto
v. HernandezSimpson

369 B.R. 36

D. Kan.

10 Kan.

5/17/2007

D

In re Kellerman

377 B.R. 302

Bankr. D. Kan.

10 Kan.

8/15/2007

V

In re Ford

387 B.R. 827

Bankr. D. Kan.

10 Kan.

5/8/2008

D

In re Padgett

389 B.R. 203

Bankr. D. Kan.

10 Kan.

5/27/2008

D

In re Bandura

2008 WL 2782851

Bankr. E.D. Ky.

6 Ky.

7/15/2008

T

In re Look

383 B.R. 210

Bankr. D. Me.

I Me.

y

In re Muldrew

2008 WL 4458798

E.D. Mich.

6 Mich.

I1.

6/9/2008
06/16/2009

3/6/2008
10/3/2008

101
The District Courts for the Western District of New York, the Eastern District of
Virginia, and the Eastern District of Michigan have held that a purchase-money security
interest secures negative equity. See Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew),
396 B.R. 915, 926 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne, 390 B.R.
191, 205 (E.D. Va. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 262
(W.D.N.Y. 2007). The District Court for the District of Kansas applied the dual-status rule.
See Citifinancial Auto v. Hemandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 48-49 (D. Kan. 2007).
102 See, e.g., In re Padgett, 389 B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (applying the dualstatus rule); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (applying the transformation rule); In re Cohrs, 373 B.R. 107, 110-11 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a
purchase-money security interest secured negative equity).
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RULE

Case Name

Citation

Court

D

In re Busby

393 B.R. 443

Bankr. S.D. Miss.

5 Miss.

8/28/2008

Y

In re Callicott

2009 WL 2870501

8th Cir.

8 Mo.

09/09/2009

y

In re Mierkowski

2009 WL 2853586

8th Cir.

8 Mo.

09/09/2009

D

In re Callicott

396 B.R. 506

E.D. Mo.

8 Mo.

11/12/2008

Y

In reWeiser

381 B.R. 263

Bankr. W.D. Mo.

8 Mo.

12/18/2007

D

In re Callicott

386 B.R. 232

Bankr. E.D. Mo.

8 Mo.

4/14/2008

D

In re Mierkowski

2008 WL 4449471

Bankr. E.D. Mo.

8 Mo.

9/29/2008

Y

In reWall

376 B.R. 769

Bankr. W.D.N.C.

4 N.C.

9/17/2007

T

In re Price

363 B.R. 734

Bankr. E.D.N.C.

4 N.C.

3/6/2007

D

In re Conyers

379 B.R. 576

Bankr. M.D.N.C.

4 N.C.

11/2/2007

D

In re Wells Fargo
Financial North
Carolina 1, Inc.

2007 WL 5297071

Bankr. E.D.N.C.

4 N.C.

11/14/2007

Cir. State

Date

Y

In re Price

562 F.3d 618

4th Cir.

4 N.C.

4/13/2009

D

In reJernigan

2008 WL 922346

Bankr. E.D.N.C.

4 N.C.

3/31/2008

Y

General Motors
Acceptance
Corporation v.
Peaslee

373 B.R. 252

W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

8/15/2007

T

In re Peaslee

358 B.R. 545

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

12/22/2006

T

In reJackson

358 B.R. 560

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

1/10/2007

T

In re Grant

359 B.R. 438

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

2/8/2007

T

In re Cassidy

362 B.R. 596

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

T

In re Colombai

362 B.R. 605

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

T

In re Freeman

362 B.R. 608

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

T

In re Martinez

362 B.R. 600

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

T

In re Phillips

362 B.R. 612

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

T

In re Rodwell

362 B.R. 616

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

T

In re Vanmanen

362 B.R. 620

Bankr. W.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

3/1/2007

Y

In re Petrocci

370 B.R. 489

Bankr. N.D.N.Y.

2 N.Y.

6/20/2007

D

In reJohnson

380 B.R. 236

Bankr. D. Or.

9 Ore.

12/18/2007

D

In re Riach

2008 WL 474384

Bankr. D. Or.

9 Ore.

2/19/2008

D

GMAC v. Mancini

390 B.R. 796

Bankr. M.D. Pa.

3 Pa.

7/15/2008

(In re Mancini)

Y

In reVinson

391 B.R. 754

Bankr. D.S.C.

4 S.C.

1/25/2008

D

In re Bray

365 B.R. 850

Bankr. W.D. Tenn.

6 Tenn.

4/11/2007

D

In reHayes

376 B.R. 655

Bankr. M.D. Tenn.

6 Tenn.

11/1/2007

D

In re Mitchell

379 B.R. 131

Bankr. M.D. Tenn.

6 Tenn. 11/13/2007

Y

In re Gray

382 B.R. 438

Bankr. E.D. Tenn.

6 Tenn.

Y

In re Dale

2009 WL 2857998

5th Cir.

5 Tex.

09/09/2009

T

In re Sanders

377 B.R. 836

Bankr. W.D. Tex.

5 Tex.

10/18/2007

Y

In re Sanders

403 B.R. 435

W.D. Tex.

5 Tex.

3/30/2009

D

In re Steele

2008 WL 2486060

Bankr. N.D. Tex.

5 Tex.

6/12/2008

D

In re Brodowski

391 B.R. 393

Bankr. S.D. Tex.

5 Tex.

7/22/2008

Y

In re Dale

2008 WL 4287058

Bankr. S.D. Tex.

5 Tex.

8/14/2008

2/15/2008
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RULE

Case Name

Citation

Court

Cir. State

Date

Y

In re Burt

378 B.R. 352

Bankr. D. Utah

10 Utah

10/24/2007

Y

In reAustin

381 B.R. 892

Bankr. D. Utah

10 Utah

2/12/2008

Y

GMAC v. Horne

390 B.R. 191

E.D. Va.

4 Va.

7/3/2008

D

In re Pajot

371 B.R. 139

Bankr. E.D. Va.

4 Va.

7/17/2007

D

In re Lavigne

2007 WL 3469454

Bankr. E.D. Va.

4 Va.

11/14/2007

D

In re Munzberg

388 B.R. 529

Bankr. D. Vt.

2 Vt.

6/3/2008

D

In re Munzberg

389 B.R. 822

Bankr. D. Vt.

2 Vt.

D

In reWear

2008 WL 217172

Bankr. W.D. Wash.

9 Wash.

1/23/2008

V

In re Dunlap

383 B.R. 113

Bankr. E.D. Wis.

7 Wis.

1/31/2008

6/3/2008

III
THE OUTLIER-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO APPLIES
FEDERAL COMMON LAW

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio reached
a unique conclusion in its decision in In re Westfall. Feeling impelled
to the conclusion that a consistent rule of law was needed by the
"maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions,"1 0 3 the court held that a
federal definition was appropriate. 0 4 The court had initially concluded that the creditor's interests were wholly non-purchase-money
by applying the transformation rule from Ohio state law. 10 5 However,
the court then requested and received additional briefing on the
choice-of-law issue and went on to conclude that the statute called for
a federal definition of "purchase-money security interest."10 6 The
court concluded that, under this federal definition, a PMSI did not
secure negative equity and the dual-status rule applied, allowing the
10 7
debtor to bifurcate the claim.
A.

Application of the Current Choice of Law Standard

To determine if a federal definition was appropriate, the court
looked initially to the three-prong standard enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit in Dzikowski v. Northern Trust Bank of Florida.'0 8 The Eleventh Circuit had summarized the considerations as "[1] the need for
uniformity, [2] whether application of state law frustrates important
federal policies, and [3] the impact of federal common law on preexWestfal4 376 B.R. at 213.
Id. at 220.
105 See id. at 211-12.
106 See id. at 212. Note, however, that the court did complain of a lack of briefing on
this issue by the creditors. Id. at 213 n.2 ("Much of Nuvell's supplemental brief is of little
help in deciding the question posed by the court. Nuvell focused on urging the court to
reconsider its previous interpretation of Ohio law.").
107 Id. at 220.
108
Dzikowski v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A. (In re Prudential of Fla. Leasing, Inc.), 478
F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007); see Westfall, 376 B.R. at 214.
103
104
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isting commercial relationships premised on state law."' 0 9 The
Westfall court characterized application of the Dzikowski standard as a
"muddle on the current facts." 11 0
Regarding the uniformity prong, the Westfall court noted that
uniformity encouraged adoption of a federal definition in order to
"promote similar treatment of debtors and creditors.""1 The court
did not view the argument as being dispositive. 112 It reasoned that
uniformity was a key factor "when there is a threat that a federal right
would be impinged or diminished" 1 13 but then determined that no
4
such federal right was at stake in this situation."
The court concluded that it could not satisfy the second prong of
the test-whether use of state law impermissibly abridged core federal
policies of the Bankruptcy Code-because of unclear congressional
intent regarding the extent of the protection afforded by the hanging
paragraph.1 5 To determine if a conflict existed, the court quoted the
Sixth Circuit's test from the context of conflict preemption, stating
that a conflict is found "'where it is impossible to comply with both
federal and state law, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'11 6 Addressing this prong of the test, the court concluded
that there was "no way to delineate the extent of the protection" that
1 17
Congress intended the hanging paragraph to provide.
After briefly noting that a federal definition provided no greater
disruption to transactions traditionally governed by state law than
would exist otherwise, the court concluded that the established standard was "a muddle on the current facts."' " 8 Rather than addressing
whether the "muddle" meant that state or federal law should apply,
the court, citing no authority, decided that the "ill-fitting drape of the
109
Dzikowski, 478 F.3d at 1298 (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th Cir. 1996)).
110
Westfall, 376 B.R. at 216.
111

Id. at 215.

112

See id. ("[A]n appeal for uniformity does not 'prove its need.'" (quoting Atherton v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997))).
113
114

Id.

]18

Id.

Id. Note that the court gave the following rule to make that determination: "'[A]
conflict is found where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. (quoting 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcrION § 36:9 (6th ed. 2006)). This test is strikingly similar to
the test articulated for the second prong of whether the use of state law impermissibly
abridges core federal policy. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
115 See Westfa, 376 B.R. at 216.
116 Id. (quoting Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 2000)).
117 Id. (discussing the sparse legislative history and noting that most courts conclude
that the intent of the hanging paragraph was to protect creditors from cram-downs, but
concluding that there was no way to delineate the extent of that protection).
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rule of decision cloth serves as proof of the necessity of an exception
on these unique facts." 1 19 The court went on to apply what it called
120
the "excluded purpose" exception.
B.

Westfall Court Applies the "Excluded Purpose Exception"

The Westfall Court articulated its "excluded purpose exception"
as meaning that "a state statute should not serve as a federal rule of
21
decision if the federal purpose was excluded from the state law."'
The court's analysis largely depended on the following language from
Comment 8 from U.C.C. § 9-103:
Whether a security interest is a "purchase-money security interest"
under other law is determined by that law. For example, decisions
under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dualstatus and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not
expressly adopt the state law definition of "purchase-money security
interest." Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Arti122
cle does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.
After a discussion of the use of the comments in interpreting the
provisions of the U.C.C., the court asserted that its use of Comment 8
did not involve the "most common objection to use of the Comments." 123 The court declared that it was using the comment not to
interpret the statute but merely to illustrate that the application of the
state law here was beyond its intended scope. 1 24 The court stated that
because of the U.C.C. drafters' "intentional non-decision" and the "far
from comprehensive" state case law, attempting to divine state law on
this subject was similar to "divining water with a forked stick." 125 This
lack of authority, combined with the language of the comments specifically stating that the drafters did not intend to apply section 9-103 to
law outside of the U.C.C., led the court to conclude that there was no
126
strong state interest in applying the state definition in this context.
C.

Cited, Misunderstood, and Not Followed: Subsequent
Treatment of In re Westfall

No court has followed In re Westfall in its choice to apply a federal
definition for PMSI. Of the cases that have cited Westfall, a number of
Id.
120 Id. Part II.B will describe the Westfall court's application of the excluded-purpose
exception. Part 1II.B will not provide any critical analysis of this approach. However, this
Note will argue in Part IV that this exception is both inappropriate and logically flawed.
121
Westfal4 376 B.R. at 216.
122 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8 (2006).
123
Westfal4 376 B.R. at 217-18.
124
See id. at 218.
119

125

Id. at 219.

126

See id.
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them have merely cited Westfall as support for the dual-status rule
without mentioning the choice-of-law question, which made Westfall
unique. 12 7 Several courts have noted the choice of a federal rule but
have declined to follow. 1 28 Other courts have cited Westfall positively
on other issues without noting the federalism issue but not for support of the dual-status rule. 2 9 In its opinion certifying to the New

York Court of Appeals the question of whether a PMSI secured negative equity, the Second Circuit cited In re Westfall twice for other points
without mentioning the federalism question.1 30 Clearly based on this
history, the Westfall court's hope of providing a uniform federal rule
and giving clarity to this area of the law has not materialized.
IV
ANALYSIS

A.

Analysis Introduction

This Part will begin by examining two approaches to the choiceof-law question. Both of these approaches choose federal law to some
127 See In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 830 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), affd sub nom. Ford v. Ford
Motor Credit Corp., 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009); In reDawn S., No. 07-15884, 2008 W"L
5747423 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008); In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 138-39 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2007) (mentioning Westfallfor the dual-status rule and then criticizing the case
for failing to recognize that the choice between the transformation rule and the dual-status
rule should be federal law); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007); In re
Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 858 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
128
See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 858-59
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (applying federal law only on the question of dual-status rule or
transformation rule); In re Howard, 405 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); In re McCauley, 398 B.R. 41, 44 & n.3 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (noting Westfall in a footnote and
declining to follow); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 464-65, 464 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008);
In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 216-17
(Bankr. D. Me. 2008) (contrasting Westfall with Sanders and deciding to apply state law
under the reasoning of Sanders), affd sub nom. Bank of Am. v. Look, No.08-129-P-H, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In reJohnson, 380 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. D.
Or. 2007); In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 06-32914, 2007 WL 3469454, at *5 n.6
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007), rev'd sub nom. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne,
390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008).
129
See Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1300-03
(11th Cir. 2008); Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Muldrew (In reMuldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 922-23
& nn.9-10 (E.D. Mich. 2008); In reHall, 400 B.R. 516,519-21 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2008); In
re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 398 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Hernandez, 388 B.R. 883,
884-85 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 668-71, 668 n.18, 671 n.24
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007).
130 See Reiber v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177,
184-85, 184 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting the Westfall court's characterization of the case
law as a "'maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions"' and citing Westfall for treatment of
the U.C.C. comments). The Second Circuit did not address or follow Westfall regarding
choice of law and concluded, at least for purposes of certifying the U.C.C. question to the
New York Court of Appeals, that state law governs the definition of PMSI. See id. at 184
("We... believe furthermore that state law governs the definition of PMSI in the hanging
paragraph.").
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extent to determine purchase-money status. While both approaches,
if uniformly adopted, would provide more certain answers than applying state law, this Note will argue that both approaches contain major
flaws in reasoning. Next, it will argue that Congress intended for state
law to apply and will provide analysis of the author's opinion of the
best answer under amended Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Finally, this Part will argue that, given the current situation and
economic climate, Congress should modify the hanging paragraph to
provide a uniform answer.
B.

Choice of Law
1. State Law Determining What Congress Meant? The Problem with
Westfall

Judge Kendig was mistaken in In re Westfall to apply a federal definition of PMSI. The plain-meaning doctrine 131 supports application
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code is
the authority cited by Black's Law Dictionary for its definition of a
PMSI, which coincides with U.C.C. § 9-103.132 The language of the
hanging paragraph itself gives no other definition, although it provides a specific definition of the term "motor vehicle."1 3 3 The legisla134
tive history provides no indication of any other definition.
Judge Kendig's "excluded purpose" exception is inherently incoherent, a problem that may explain the lack of authority cited. The
language of Comment 8, even if one were to assume that it was a binding interpretation of the U.C.C., is merely a truism. Ironically, Judge
Kendig's exception violates that truism. The Comment concludes,
"Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does not,
and could not, determine a question of federal law."' 35 By looking to
state law, written prior to the enactment of the BAPCPA, Judge Kendig determined that Congress could not have chosen to defer to state
law as a rule of decision under the BAPCPA. He could have meant
that Congress must have been aware of Comment 8 and must have
chosen to respect it, but he provided no evidence in the legislative
history to justify such an assertion. Instead, he seemed to be implying
that the state law itself excludes this purpose. This reading has the
state law choosing the federal rule of decision rather than the federal
131
See generally In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 912 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (providing a
detailed analysis of the plain-meaning doctrine), affd sub nom Graupner,537 F.3d 1295.
132
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009).
133
Compare 11U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (stating as to purchase-money security interests
only that "section 506 shall not apply to a claim . .. if the creditor has a purchase money
security interest"), with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (providing a cross-reference to 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102 for a definition of "motor vehicle").
134
See infra Part IV.C (discussing the limited legislative history of the provision).
135 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8 (2006).
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rule of decision choosing to look to state law. In the words of Comment 8, state law is determining the federal-law question of whether to
look to the state law. Of course, state law itself cannot determine federal law. Unfortunately, this answer does not assist with the question
of whether Congress intended to look to state law. Part IV.C examines
this question.
2.

Splitting the Baby-Where the Ninth Circuit Went Wrong

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, in In re Penrod,136
was mistaken in the application of state law to answer that a PMSI did
not secure the negative equity and the application of federal law to
determine that the "dual-status" rule applied. 137 Under this rule, a
federal court would apply the dual-status rule regardless of whether
the state involved had adopted the transformation rule in negativeequity situations.1 3 8 This splitting-the-baby approach-similar to the
approach of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Texas139 -while purporting to apply state law to determine purchasemoney status, does not apply state law and is unsound.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, one cannot separate the
questions of whether a PMSI secures a debt and whether the dualstatus or the transformation rule applies because the latter question
necessarily answers the former. For example, consider a situation
where the state law holds that a PMSI does not secure negative equity,
but the claim includes a portion that would have purchase-money status if no other amounts were included. If one stopped at this point,
without answering the question of dual-status or transformation, the
only question answered is a purely hypothetical one: "If no other
amounts were included, would a PMSI secure this portion (not including the negative equity) of the claim?" Whether a PMSI actually does
secure that portion depends on whether the dual-status or transformation rule applies. If the transformation rule applies, no PMSI secures
any portion of the claim. If the dual-status rule applies, a PMSI
secures the part of the claim having purchase-money status. The question of dual-status rule or transformation rule is actually a question of
which of two definitions applies.
136

Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 856-59 (B.A.P.

9th Cir. 2008).
137

See id. at 859.

138
See id. (discussing the distinction between applying the dual-status rule as the state
law and adopting the dual-status rule as a uniform federal rule).
139
See In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 & n.20 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) (applying state
law to determine that negative equity was not secured by a PMSI and holding that the
hanging paragraph required that if part of the claim was not secured by a PMSI then the
hanging paragraph did not apply), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit did not
seem to appreciate the significance of choosing between the dual-status and transformation rules. Because the choice of dual-status or
transformation rule is a choice between definitions, the panel in fact
interpreted the statute to create a federal definition for PMSI in situations involving negative equity. 140 One could phrase this definition as
follows: a PMSI secures a claim to the extent that there is a portion of
the claim that under the relevant state law a PMSI would secure if that
portion were isolated from all other portions of the claim. When
phrased this way, one would naturally question whether the simple
language of the hanging paragraph could support such a complicated
interpretation.1 4 1 The lack of any statement regarding choice of law
or definition argues against Congress having intended to adopt such a
complicated rule of decision.
Although one could read the lack of statement regarding choice
of law to imply using only a state-law definition, 142 one could determine-as did the court in In re Penrod-thata split definition should
apply. Even though applying the dual-status rule in this situation is
143
not coherent, applying the transformation rule is less problematic.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas took this ap144
proach in In re Sanders.
The court in In re Sanders applied the transformation rule as a
federal rule for purposes of the hanging paragraph. The court concluded that narrowing the exception of the hanging paragraph by requiring that a PMSI secure the entire claim "comports best with
accepted canons of statutory construction." 145 This rule does not suffer from the same problems as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appel140
See Penrod,392 B.R. at 859 n.25 (using language that limited the application of the
federal rule to negative-equity situations and stating that, "adopting the Dual Status Rule as
a uniform federal rule.... we would apply the Dual Status Rule even if, under the majority
version of UCC § 9-103(h), a state decided to adopt the Transformation Rule in negative
equity situations" (emphasis added)).
141
See 1l U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (using much simpler language with no mention of a
split definition). To be fair, the court could have reached an identical, less problematic
result by interpreting the language of the hanging paragraph to apply to any obligation
that is secured at least in part by a PMSI. This approach was taken by the District Court for
the Western District of Texas. Sanders, 403 B.R. 435, rev'g Sanders, 377 B.R. 836; see also infra
notes 132-35 and accompanying text. However, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel grounded its decision in the definition of PMSI, not an interpretation of whether the
hanging paragraph required the entire obligation to be secured by a PMSI. See generally
Penrod, 392 B.R. 835.
142
See infra Part M.D.
143
See supra Part tV.B.2 (discussing incoherence in the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's approach in In re Penrod).
144
See Sanders, 377 B.R. at 864 ("[S]ection 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code affords
special protection ... so long as the purchase money security interest secures all of the
debt comprising the creditor's claim.").
145
Id.
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late Panel's dual-status-rule approach in In re Penrod. State law
determines whether a PMSI secures all or part of the claim by applying its version of the U.C.C., which will use either the dual-status or
the transformation rule. The federal rule, as articulated by the court
in In re Sanders, determines not PMSI status but whether or not a PMSI
must secure the entire amount of the claim for the claim to fall under
146
the protection of the hanging paragraph.
This rule functions differently from applying a federal "dual-status" rule. If the state law applies the dual-status rule, then a PMSI
would not secure the entire amount; the Sanders rule would then deny
protection of the hanging paragraph, a result similar in effect to a
state-law transformation rule. If the state law applies the transformation rule, then a PMSI would not secure any amount, and again, the
hanging paragraph would not apply. If the state law held that a PMSI
secured negative equity, and no other non-purchase-money obligations were included, then a PMSI would secure the entire amount.
C.

Congress Meant for State Law to Control

Three courts-the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas, and the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio-have applied federal
law to some extent. As demonstrated above, all three approaches are
less than desirable, and the opinions of both the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio contain serious flaws in reasoning. The Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Texas made less serious errors in
determining that federal law should apply; however, its textualist argument failed to address congressional intent.
The plain language of the statute indicates that state law controls.
The term "purchase-money security interest" originated in the Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, the only authority Black's Law Dictionary cites for its definition of a PMSI is the Uniform Commercial
Code. 147 The term is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, even
though it is used both in the hanging paragraph and in 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f).1 48 In this regard, the court in In re Sanders did not err. The
Sanders court asserted that the language clearly indicates that a PMSI
must secure the entire claim for it to qualify under the hanging paragraph. Although the court makes a reasonable argument for this
reading, it does not address Congress's intent for state law to apply.
146
See id. (holding that, because the claim included purchase-money and nonpurchase-money security interests, it did not qualify for the protection of the hanging
paragraph).
147
BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009).
148
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2006).
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Some courts and commentators have lamented the lack of legislative history for the hanging paragraph. However, as one court put it,
the "only clear intent discerned from the legislative history of the
hanging paragraph is that Congress intended to provide more protection to creditors with purchase-money security interests." 149 The paragraph's position within the BAPCPA supports this argument. It is
section 306 of Chapter 13 of the Act. Section 306 is entitled "Giving
Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13," and it appears in a
chapter of the BAPCPA entitled "Restoring the Foundation for Secured Credit."' 5 0 The House Judiciary Committee's report recommending the passage of the bill discusses the hanging paragraph in
15
two places; in both, it discusses only protection of secured creditors. '
There is also some evidence that Congress wanted to make Chapter 13
1 52
less attractive to debtors.
Though the Sanders court makes a plausible argument, given the
clear intent of the hanging paragraph, the result, similar to the statelaw transformation rule, does not meet the congressional intent. The
result is too narrow to provide the type of protection that Congress
seems to have envisioned. The application chosen by the Penrod court
does not reflect the language of the statute and is incoherent. Given
these issues, the general meaning of PMSI as a state-law term from the
U.C.C. and the lack of legislative history regarding a more complex
choice-of-law rule, Congress must have intended state law to apply.
D.

Uniform Commercial Code Application

In applying state law, the better answer is that a PMSI does not
secure negative equity and the dual-status rule should apply.
The U.C.C. defines a PMSI in section 103 of Article 9. Under the
U.C.C., a security interest is a PMSI to the extent that the goods-in
this case the motor vehicle-"are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest."' 5 3 Section 9-103(a) (1) defines
"purchase-money collateral" as "goods ...
149

that [secure] a purchase-

In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) (discussing intent in the

context of deciding whether, pursuant to the hanging paragraph, surrender of motor vehicles to creditors would result in a full satisfaction of the creditor's claims).
150
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80-81 (2005).

151
See H.R. RFP. No. 109-31, at 17 (2005) (labeling discussion as "Protections for Secured Creditors"); id. at 71-72 (describing the application of the hanging paragraph).
152
Oversight of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (providing an example of how the law removed some of the incentives for
Chapter 13 filing and identifying the anti-cramdown provision of the hanging paragraph as
one such provision).
153
U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (2006).
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money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral."' 154 Difficulty occurs in the definition of a "purchase-money obligation" contained in U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2).
Which part of the language of U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2) should apply
depends on whether the creditor was the seller or a third-party lender.
For third-party lenders, the first half of § 9-103(a) (2), the "part of the
price" language does not apply. 155 The "part of the price" language
refers to sellers who accept an obligation to themselves from the obligors. The correct focus in those cases is on the following language
from U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2): "for value given to enable the debtor to
acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so
used.' 5 6 Therefore, for third-party lenders the focus becomes
whether value given by a third-party lender to pay for negative equity
does "enable the debtor to acquire rights inor the use of the collateral"; and for seller-obligees, the question becomes whether the negative equity was all or part of the price of the collateral. 1 57 However, this
distinction may be of little importance because courts and even the
Code's official comments often do not distinguish between the two,
158
implying that the result should be the same under either provision.
Comment 3 of U.C.C. § 9-103 elaborates on the definition and
gives the following list of types of items that are included in either
"price" of collateral or "value given to enable": "obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral,
sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of
storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and enforcement, attorney's fees, and other similar obligations."'1 59 This list is not exclusive, as the last item, "other similar
obligations" indicates. Courts differ on whether negative equity is a
"similar obligation.' 6 °
154 Id. §9-103(a)(1).
155 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 31-6(a), at 135 ("[A] third party... that lends
money to a prospective buyer to assist the buyer in the purchase can .. .also qualify as a
purchase money lender under section 9-103 (a) (2). That person must make advances or
incur an obligation 'to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral,' and,
the money lent must be 'in fact so used.'" (footnote omitted)).
156
U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2); see 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 31-6(a), at 135.
157
See, e.g., In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 911-12 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (focusing, in
a case involving a seller-lender, on whether the obligation was incurred as all or part of the
price of the collateral), affd sub nom. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 537 F.3d 1295 (11 th
Cir. 2008).
158
See, e.g.,
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796,
800-01 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (failing to distinguish in the context of a third-party lender
holding the security interest); U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (failing to distinguish when providing
a list of items that would be included and listing what "the 'price' of collateral or the 'value
given to enable' includes").
159
U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
160
See supra tbl.
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The better-reasoned argument is that payment of the negative equity from the trade-in vehicle does not enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of the collateral. None of the listed obligations are
related to prior transactions, unlike negative equity, which must originate in a prior transaction. While some courts have held that negative
equity does "enable" the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral because the buyer could not make the purchase without the trade-in, the
majority have held that negative equity does not "enable" the debtor
16
to acquire rights in the collateral. 1
Because a PMSI does not secure the negative equity, the dualstatus rule is the better approach. 162 The drafters of Article 9 provided guidance in the non-consumer context through section 9103(f) (1).163 The drafters, however, did not find the courage to give a
rule for consumer transactions and adopted section 9-103(h) specifically disavowing any inference of application to that setting. 164 The
drafters' unwillingness to unsettle previous case law under prior Article 9 does not mean that applying the dual-status rule is any less preferential. The transformation rule results in very harsh treatment;
even a tiny fraction of non-purchase-money obligation will cause the
entire interest to lose purchase-money status. 165 The majority of
courts holding that negative equity is not a purchase-money obligation
apply the dual-status rule.1 66 Courts should apply this rule, which is
analogous to the business rule.

161
See id. However, one should note that there is a growing consensus among the
federal circuit courts that a PMSI does secure negative equity. See, e.g., In re Price, 562 F.3d
618 (4th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.
2009); In re Mierkowski, No. 08-3866, 2009 "AL 2853586 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); In re Dale,
No. 08-20583, 2009 WL 2857998 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); Graupner,537 F.3d 1295. While
these courts are interpreting state law, at least one of the circuits has articulated that given
the uniform nature of the provisions, courts may give added weight to these decisions
across state lines. See Ford, 574 F.3d at 1283 n.2 (noting the identical nature of the provisions being interpreted).
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One should not consider the application to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act in determining choice of rule. See supra Part IV.C.
163
Although note that in the case of the negative equity from a loan held by the same
financier, negative equity might retain purchase-money status. See U.C.C. § 9-103(0 (3).
164
Notice, however, that Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, and South Dakota have omitted the
limiting language of U.C.C. § 9-103(h) from their versions of the U.C.C. See IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 28-9-103 (2001); KAN. U.C.C. ANN. §84-9-103 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., CoM.
LAw § 9-103 (LexisNexis 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103 (2004).
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See, e.g., In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Brodowski, 391 B.R
393 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); GMAC v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2008); In re Hernandez, 388 B.R. 883 (Bankr. C.D. I1. 2008).
166 See supra tbl.
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Cleaning Up Its Own Mess-The Need for Congressional
Action

It does not follow from the intent to apply state law that Congress
anticipated or desired the resulting inconsistency. Unfortunately, as a
number of courts have lamented,1 67 little legislative history is available.' 68 However, even from that limited history, what seems clear is
69
that the purpose of the hanging paragraph was to aid creditors.
Even if Congress intended such a variety of rules, the result is not
aiding creditors due to difficulties in valuing loans. Therefore,
whether one thinks that the aid to creditors was an appropriate or
inappropriate goal, the hanging paragraph is aiding neither lenders
nor borrowers.
At one point, this difficulty was not of great concern to taxpayers.
Today, however, the stakes for the taxpayer-as a sixty-percent share70
holder in the so-called "new" General Motors-are much higher.
Taxpayers have contributed over fifty billion dollars to General Motors alone, 17' and the government is unlikely to recoup much of the
investment. 72 This issue is of great concern to the taxpayer-shareholder because of the extent to which the industry has historically re73
lied on its financing divisions for revenue.'
This situation presents Congress with an opportunity to reevaluate the wisdom of the hanging paragraph. Although some will likely
argue that Congress should remove the hanging paragraph from the
Bankruptcy Code, this would be a mistake. The government has invested $50 billion in General Motors, $34 billion in Chrysler, and
$12.5 billion in GMAC. 174 Allowing reckless borrowers to leave the
167

See, e.g., Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In rePenrod), 392 B.R. 835, 856-57

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
168 See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
169 See supra Part IV.C (discussing congressional intent regarding the hanging paragraph and supporting legislative history).
170 Peter Whoriskey, With Bankruptcy Behind It, GM Focuses on a Culture Change, WASH.
PosT, July 11, 2009 ("The U.S. Treasury owns 60.8 percent of the new company's common
stock ....").
171
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Id.

Christopher S. Rugaber, Taxpayers Face Heavy Losses on Auto Bailout, Sept. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.greenchange.org/article.php?id=4914 ("The Congressional Oversight Panel did not provide an estimate of the projected loss ... [, b]ut it said most of the
$23 billion initially provided to General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC late last year is
unlikely to be repaid.").
173
See Carty, supra note 33. Note that in May the Treasury announced that it would
swap $884 million of its preferred-stock investment in GMAC for common stock giving a
35.4% equity stake, a stake that could rise above 50% if more of those investments were
converted later. See Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Dan Fitzpatrick, GMAC Says It Needs $1 Billion
in Cost Cuts, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2009, at B5.
174
SeeJeff Bennett & Kate Haywood, Chrysler FinancialRepays TARP Loan, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, July 14, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB24759479331840133.
html. The government had loaned Chrysler Financial $1.5 billion from the Troubled Asset
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automakers with these debts will merely transfer the crammed down
amounts to the taxpayer. For these reasons, Congress should retain
the anti-cram-down provisions in the revised legislation.
On the other hand, the problem of unwise borrowing, which
both exposes the economy as a whole and the individual consumer to
great risk, cautions against retaining the anti-cram-down provisions. A
definition including negative equity would encourage lenders to continue to make these problematic "upside down" loans. Yet, a definition functioning like the transformation rule would be a windfall to
unwise borrowers at the expense of lenders, other consumers, and
even the taxpayer. An open definition functioning like the dual-status
rule would run the risk of similar problems to the current definition
regarding other items included in automotive loans such as gap insurance and extended warranties. Therefore, a solution that balances
both these concerns and the prevention of transferring defaults for
existing loans to the lenders and ultimately the taxpayers would be
ideal.
To meet these goals, Congress should take a two-prong approach.
For the first prong, regarding new loans, the best solution is a definition that provides an exclusive list of elements of the transaction that
the statute will cover. This list should not include negative equity or
other add-ons for protection from cram-down. Not including these
items will reduce incentives for additional irresponsible lending. By
providing an exclusive list of elements that the provision will cover,
questions will not arise regarding whether another element, such as
extended warranties, is covered. Since this list would not include negative equity and other add-ons, it should apply only to new loans.
For the second prong, regarding existing loans, a provision specifically including negative equity will prevent debtors from cramming
down their loans and potentially passing the costs on to the taxpayer.
Including negative equity will avoid a windfall to unwise borrowers by
preventing cram-down of loans made under the expectation that the
Code would not permit it. That expectation exists because such treatment more closely matches the language of the current statute, the
original congressional intent, and the treatment of negative equity by
the majority of courts. The combination of these two provisions will
achieve the proper incentives and disincentives while avoiding exposing the taxpayer to greater risk on the investment in the automakers
and their finance divisions.

Relief Program. See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Plans to Lend Chrysler $1.5 Billion for Auto Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at B3. However, this loan has already been paid off. See Bennett &
Haywood, supra.
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CONCLUSION

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
made many changes to bankruptcy law. Regardless of one's position
on this legislation, the lack of consistency in the treatment of the anticram-down provision is problematic. Clearly, Congress failed to appreciate the scope of problems associated with the use of the term
"purchase-money security interest." As a result, courts have reached a
number of different results in applying state law. A number of these
courts have incorrectly applied the Uniform Commercial Code, and
others, in a well-intentioned effort to provide some uniformity to the
treatment of these loans, have inappropriately applied federal law to
determine the meaning of PMSI.
Congress and the courts have left lenders and borrowers with little or no guidance regarding how bankruptcy courts will treat negative
equity in Chapter 13 cases. Whether one thinks the hanging paragraph was an appropriate way of "restoring the foundation of secured
credit," an unnecessary provision because the foundation of secured
credit did not need restoration, or a giveaway to lenders who engage
in abusive lending practices, its result in this area is clear.1 75 Congress
has created the problem, and Congress should take the responsibility
of cleaning it up. Congress can best clean up this mess by enacting a
new provision providing a clear definition in keeping with the original
Act for loans made under the current section 1325(a) and a new rule
removing the hanging paragraph's protection for negative equity financed in new loans. Such a rule will provide clarity and proper incentives for future loans and match what seems to have been the
intent of the current version.
In the mean time, courts handling cases under the current law
should apply state law. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
best answer is that negative equity is not a purchase-money obligation,
meaning that a PMSI does not secure that part of the obligation.
Rather than applying the transformation rule, courts should apply the
dual-status rule analogous to the rule for non-consumer transactions.
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Of course, a number of articles address both the benefits and problems of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. This topic is outside of the
scope of this Note; in order to focus on the hanging paragraph and solutions to the
problems with the use of the term "purchase-money security interest," the author offers no
opinion on the subject.

